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Much public discussion about foreign aid has focused on whether and how to increase its 
quantity. But recently aid quality has come to the fore, by which is meant the effectiveness 
of the aid delivery process. This paper focuses on one process problem, the proliferation of 
aid projects and the associated administrative burden for recipients. It models aid delivery as 
a set of production activities (projects) with two inputs, the donor’s aid and a recipient-side 
resource, and two outputs, namely, development and “throughput,” which proxies for the 
private benefits for both donor and recipient of implementing projects, from kickbacks to 
career rewards for disbursing. The donor’s allocation of aid across projects is taken as 
exogenous while the recipient’s allocation of its resource is modeled and subject to a budget 
constraint. Unless the recipient cares purely about development, increasing aid can reduce 
development in some circumstances. Sunk costs, representing the administrative burden for 
the recipient of donor meetings and reports, are introduced. Using data on the distribution of 
projects by size and country, simulations of aid increases are run in order to examine how 
the project distribution evolves, how the recipient’s resource allocation responds, and how 
this affects development if the recipient is not a pure development optimizer. With Cobb-
Douglas production, a threshold is revealed beyond which marginal aid effectiveness drops 
sharply. It occurs when development maximization calls for the recipient to withdraw from 
some donor-backed projects—but the recipient does not, for the sake of throughput. Donors 
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Public discussion about foreign aid has long focused on the question of “how much?” Since the 
early 1960s, some have called on rich countries to give 0.7 percent of their GDP in aid (Clemens 
and Moss 2005). The proposed International Financing Facility would double aid in the short 
run. The U.N. Secretary General’s report, Investing in Development, calls for a tripling (UNDP 
2005b). Recently, however, aid quality has come to the fore in the public policy debate 
(Roodman 2004; UNDP 2005a; World Bank 2005; ActionAid 2005; the Paris Declaration of 
2005). 
Quality can be defined as the capacity, per dollar, for aid to increase development and 
reduce poverty. In practice, it has much to do with efficiencies, or lack thereof, in the aid 
delivery process. And while one might debate whether aid quantity ought to rise in any given 
country, it is hard to argue that aid quality should not. Under the rubric of “aid quality” come a 
number of themes: untying (dropping requirements that aid be accepted in kind or spent on 
donor-country goods and services); selectivity (for countries deemed more deserving and 
propitious as recipients); harmonization (of donors’ procurement, reporting, and other 
requirements); alignment (with the recipient’s own goals and plans); coordination (among donors 
to prevent duplicative efforts); and proliferation (of many small aid projects). In February 2003, 
representatives of 40 donor agencies signed the Rome Declaration calling for greater 
harmonization and alignment of aid, coordination, simplification of donor practices, among other 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in George Mavrotas and Mark McGillivray, eds., Development Aid: A Fresh Look (Palgrave-
Macmillan). For excellent comments, the author thanks Peter Timmer, William Cline, and participants in three 
seminars—at the January 2005 conference of the Global Development Network in Dakar, at the Center for Global 
Development in February, and at World Institute for Development Economics Research in September.   3
things. They reconvened in 2005 and issued the Paris Declaration, which defines a dozen 
indicators of a donor’s aid quality and commits donors to assist in collecting them.. 
  This paper focuses on the problem of project proliferation, which is thought to impose 
great administrative burdens on some recipient governments. Using available data on aid 
activities it first shows why one should worry that there are too many aid projects. It then defines 
a model in which a recipient’s resources combine with aid in projects to produce development. If 
donor and recipient do not both maximize development, but rather such things as meeting per 
diems and the career benefits of disbursement for aid officials, collectively labeled “throughput,” 
then increasing aid can reduce development. The extent to which this happens depends on the 
degree to which throughput and development are not complements. 
The paper then moves to the continuous setting, positing a suite of projects lognormally 
distributed by aid size. Sunk costs are also introduced to represent the recipient-side cost of 
donor meetings and quarterly reports and economies of scale. A simulation is run to illustrate 
how the strategy that the recipient uses to allocate its resource across projects varies as total aid 
expands. The simulation also shows how this affects development. The relationship between 
total aid and the distribution of projects by size is calibrated using detailed data on aid projects 
covering most donor and recipient countries. When total aid increases beyond a certain point and 
projects proliferate in the way suggested by the data, the effective marginal product of aid, 
factoring in recipient behavior, declines sharply, and can even go negative. Thus the model hints 
at the existence of thresholds beyond which aid becomes much less effective in practice; it gives 
rise to a notion of absorptive capacity. 
 
Background and motivation 
According to Elliott Morss (1984), during the 1950s and 1960s most foreign assistance took the   4
form of program aid, by which he means large infrastructure investments as well as packages of 
sector support, such as for agriculture, that include finance, commodities, and technical 
assistance. However, as concerns grew about the effectiveness of aid, legislatures demanded 
more evidence of results. This led by the 1970s to greater use of project aid, which “entails a 
more specific statement of objectives and means.” The multiplication of aid projects with more 
narrowly and precisely defined goals and more measurable outcomes was compounded by the 
multiplication of donors after Western European nations and Japan recovered from World War 
II. Morrs identifies several troubling consequences, including lack of coordination on the donor 
side and lack of ownership on the recipient side. In addition is the administrative burden 
associated with the sheer number of projects: “[E]fforts to implement the large number of 
discrete, donor-financed projects, each with its own specific objectives and reporting 
requirements, use up far more time and effort than is appropriate.” 
There is no sign that the administrative burden has lessened in the 20 years since Morrs 
wrote. Van de Walle and Johnston (1996) reported roughly 60 active donors and 600 ongoing 
projects each in Kenya and Zambia in the mid-1980s, and some 40 donors and 2,000 aid projects 
in Tanzania in the mid-1990s. Starting from a hypothetical project count of 600, they suggest 
that recipient governments typically file 2,400 quarterly reports to donors and host 1,000 
“missions” from donor officials to monitor project activities. These two numbers appear to have 
been picked up by a speechwriter for then–World Bank President James Wolfensohn and 
misinterpreted as a fact about Tanzania, leading to the urban legend that Tanzania files 2,400 
reports and hosts 1,000 missions each year. If anything, the figures are substantial underestimates 
for Tanzania. 
In fact, in the spring of 2003, the Tanzanian ministry of finance took a striking step to 
manage the administrative burdens associated with aid. It announced that the period April-  5
                                                
August each year would be a “quiet time” during which only the most urgent donor missions 
would be received. Tanzanian officials were to use this time to prepare the central government 
budget. In addition, as a sort of naming-and-shaming exercise, the government began posting on 
the Web a cumulative list of major meetings with donors.
2 
Data suggest that the project proliferation problem extends beyond Tanzania and might 
be worsening. Any effort to count projects must begin with definitions because, like most 
important concepts, that of a “project” is complex on close examination. Is an organized effort to 
build ten schools ten projects or one? Where does one draw the line between large road-building 
projects and “programs” of support to the transportation sector? The definition used in this paper 
is partly principled, partly pragmatic, driven by the structure of available data. The best relevant 
and available data source is the Creditor Report System (CRS) database maintained by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in Paris. CRS Table 1 contains detailed information 
on individual aid commitments by bilateral and multilateral donors to fund what the CRS 
reporting directives refer to as “aid activities” (DAC 2002).
3 The CRS guidelines for donors 
reporting to the database define an aid activity only to this extent: 
An aid activity can take many forms. It could be a project or a programme, a cash transfer or 
delivery of goods, a training course or a research project, a debt relief operation or a 
contribution to an NGO (DAC 2002). 
 
The data begin in 1973. Despite the “creditor” in its name, the database covers both grant and 
loan commitments, including nonconcessional ones, and even a few equity investments. 
  With respect to this data set, a “project” is defined here as an entry in CRS Table 1: 
•  that is not an equity investment; 
 
2 See http://www.tzdac.or.tz/Mission%20calendar.doc. 
3 CRS Table 5, which begins much more recently, has data on disbursement rather than commitments. This might 
seem more relevant since not all commitments are realized. But the reporting concept for this table is the financial 
transaction rather than the aid activity, and there can be many transactions per activity   6
                                                
•  that fits the definition of Overseas Development Assistance, meaning that it is a grant or 
adequately concessional loan for a development purpose; 
•  whose recipient is identified as a specific country, as opposed to, say, “Africa 
unspecified”; 
•  is not identified as being for administrative costs or support for nongovernmental 
organizations; 
•  is not identified as being emergency aid. 
Somewhat confusingly, this definition includes Sector-Wide Action Programs and budget 
support, which Morss calls program aid. These are in effect very large projects, assuming 
commitments to them are in fact large in dollar terms. It seems appropriate to include programs 
since excluding them (to the extent possible with a CRS coding system not designed for the 
purpose) could paint a misleading picture of how much individual donors tend to proliferate their 
overall aid portfolios. 
  Table 1 shows that the number of projects in the database according to this definition 
nearly tripled between 1995 and 2003. Better reporting—more donors providing data, and on 
larger fractions of their portfolios—may account for the bulk of this increase. For this reason, 
comparisons based on cross-sections of the CRS database may be more meaningful than those 
based on time series. Table 2 therefore reports the top-ten recipients of project commitments 
during 2001–03. It aggregates over three years on the idea that this proxies better for ongoing 




4 Examination of extracts from the World Bank Development Gateway’s Accessible Information on Development 
Activities (AiDA) database, suggested this value for average project duration. The AiDA database draws on the 
CRS and other sources, and contains project start and stop dates for some entries, unlike the CRS. However, it is 
inferior in other respects for the purposes of this study.   7












Table 2. Number of reported project commitments, 2001–03, top ten recipients 
Country Number 
Mozambique       1,921 
India        1,910 
China       1,885 
Russia       1,721 
Ethiopia       1,677 
Indonesia       1,639 
Vietnam       1,609 
Tanzania       1,528 
Serbia & Montenegro       1,497 
South Africa       1,466 
 
  Scholarly interest in proliferation also appears to be rising. Arnab Acharya, Ana Fuzzo de 
Lima, and Mick Moore (2006) develop indices of donors’ tendency to proliferate (disperse) aid 
among recipients, and of the tendency of recipients’ aid to be fragmented among many donors. 
They find that the donors that are the greatest proliferators are especially likely to aid the 
countries with the greatest fragmentation. 
  Stepenen Knack and Aminur Rahman (2004) investigate an index of fragmentation 
similar to that of Acharya, de Lima, and Moore as a determinant of another variable of interest, 
government bureaucratic quality. In their model, donors compete with each other and the 
government for the scarce resource of skilled nationals. Hiring a skilled professional away from 
the government reduces the quality of public governance, which is a public-good input to all aid 
projects. This creates an externality. The lower a donor’s share in the recipient’s aid “market,”   8
                                                
the less it internalizes this externality, and the more incentive it has to poach the best people from 
the government. Knack and Rahman thus predict—and appear to confirm empirically—that aid 
fragmentation reduces the quality of public bureaucracy. 
  Both of these contributions relate to the proliferation of donors, not projects. Though 
donor and project proliferation no doubt go hand in hand, they are distinct notions. Countries 
with few donors can have many projects, and vice versa. The present study therefore focuses on 
project proliferation and illustrates how it can limit the ability of recipient countries to absorb aid 
effectively. 
  Thus another literature is relevant, that on absorptive capacity. According to a review in 
by Michael Clemens and Steven Radelet (2003), a number of studies have attempted to measure 
absorptive capacity for aid via inclusion of linear and quadratic aid terms in growth regressions 
(Hadjimichael et al. 1995; Durbarry, Gemmell, and Greenaway 1998; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 
2001; Hansen 2001; Lensink and White 2001; Collier and Dollar 2002; Dalgaard, Hansen, and 
Tarp 2002; Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 2004). Clemens and Radelet report that the implied 
turning points in the marginal impact of aid range from 15% to 45% of recipient GDP. 
  Many pathways have been suggested that would cause the marginal productivity of aid to 
fall and even go negative as aid increases. These can be organized along the sequence of aid flow 
from donor to recipient central government to field implementation.
5 Donor practices— 
imposition of locally inappropriate project designs, internal pressure to disburse, heavy demands 
for meetings and reports, incompatible fiscal years and reporting requirements, and so on—are 
one large set of potential problems. On the recipient side, at the national level, aid discourages 
tax effort, distorts domestic political economy, and can cause Dutch Disease. And recipients too 
have administrative problems, including small and often overwhelmed line ministries, and 
 
5 I think Peter Timmer for this organizing principle.   9
corruption. Meanwhile, aid can siphon the best people away from government, as in Knack and 
Rahman. Many of these recipient administrative problems also pertain at the project 
implementation level. Finally, as the aid flow increases, monitoring and evaluation become 
increasingly important in order to detect the problems just listed and help ensure coordination 
among donors. But good monitoring and evaluation is generally lacking. 
  The effect modeled here has to do with the limits imposed by recipient administrative 
capacity, whether at the center or in the field. Implicitly, it also about the failure of donors to 
monitor, evaluate, and coordinate in order to limit aid project proliferation. 
 
A microeconomic model of aid projects 
The model developed here depicts the aid process as a set of production activities, one per 
project, with identical technologies. The key ideas in the model are: 
•  There is one recipient. 
•  Aid projects have two inputs—aid and a recipient-side resource that can be thought of as 
spending on capital or recurring costs or the time of officials in recipient ministries. 
•  The recipient has a fixed budget for its resource, which it is free to allocate among aid 
projects to maximize its utility. 
•  The donors’ portfolio of projects is taken as exogenously determined. 
•  Aid projects have two outputs too. One is “development,” which can be thought of as 
growth and poverty reduction. The other is “throughput” and is meant to capture the more 
direct benefits of aid projects to the officials involved. On the donor side, this may 
encompass the political dynamic of aid tying and the career benefits of being associated 
with disbursing projects. On the recipient side, it may include similar professional 
benefits, as well as the high salaries that can come with working with donors, “sitting fees” for going to meetings, travel, per diems, and so on. On both sides, it could also 
reflect dynamics of corruption. 
•  Each aid project produces its two outputs—development and throughput—
simultaneously. Throughput and development are generally complements, but not exactly 
so. Development happens in the recipient countries, while throughput can accrue to both 
donors and recipients. 
•  Outputs are additive. If two projects would each by themselves produce one unit of 
development, then together they produce two. 
•  In general, both donor and recipient care about both development and throughput, but can 
weigh them differently. 
•  The model allows for sunk costs on the recipient side—investments in hosting meetings, 
filing reports, etc., that do not directly contribute to production but consume recipient 
resources and are required for aid to flow. 
  Appendix 1 describes the general model. We confine ourselves here to two pairs of 
relatively intuitive examples. In the first pair, the recipient is purely developmentalist. In the 
second pair, it values throughput only. 
 
Example 1. The recipient is purely developmentalist and the donor increases aid to one project. 
There are two projects. Production of both development and throughput is Cobb-Douglas, with 
constant returns to scale in the case of throughput. Let 
, 1






















  10where Ai and Ri are in the inputs of aid and the recipient resource into project i, Di and Bi are the 
outputs of development and throughput (“B” for private benefit), D and B are total development 
and throughput, and uR is the recipient’s utility. The recipient’s problem is 
( ) B D uR ,   max
R
 
such that R R R ≤ + 2 1 and    . 0 , 2 1 ≥ R R
Working with the Lagrangian, the first-order conditions for the recipient’s optimum work out to 
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and have the solution 
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Notice that γD is 1 exactly when there are constant returns to scale in development (αD + ρD = 1) 
and greater (less) than 1 when there are economies (diseconomies) of scale. Because the 
term in (1) is the only one that varies with i, it shapes the allocation: when there are 
economies of scale in development, the recipient allocates its resources more than proportionally 
to the projects with larger aid budgets, but does the opposite if there are scale diseconomies. 
When there are constant returns to scale in development, the recipient allocates its resource in 




  We now examine how the production of development varies when the donor increases 
aid to project 1 while holding aid to the project 2 fixed. Applying the chain rule to the equation 
for D, the quantity of interest is 








































This says that the aid increase affects development in three ways: directly, through increasing the 
output from project 1, and indirectly, by causing the recipient to change its resource allocation to 
both project 1 and project 2. However, since the recipient’s current resource allocation 
maximizes D, it is just at the point where a marginal shift in resources between the two projects 
has zero net impact on D—otherwise D would not currently be maximized. So, as in equation (7) 
in the Appendix, the indirect effects cancel, leaving only the first term. Thus 
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 (This uses the fact that αD + γDβD = γD.) This expression is always positive. 
  Conclusion: if the recipient is purely developmentalist, expanding the aid pie never hurts. 
Adding aid expands production possibilities for the recipient, which can only cause development 
to increase. This is true even if the aid increase brings thousands of tiny new projects. 
 
Example 2. The recipient is purely developmentalist and the donor moves aid from one project to 
another. We use the set-up from Example 1. But this time, the donor moves aid from project 2 to 
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which is to say, when A1 > A2  and γD > 1 (economies of scale dominate in development) or when 
A1 < A2  and γD < 1 (diseconomies dominate). 
  Conclusion: When a donor moves aid from one project to another, the recipient 
reallocates its resources in the same direction, and if the gaining project is more economical in 
scale than the old one, development goes up. Otherwise, it goes down. 
 
Example 3. The recipient cares only about throughput and the donor increases aid to one project. 
Again, we slightly modify the set-up in Example 1, this time by setting 
. ) , ( B B D u =  
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The solution is the same too except that an analogously defined γB replaces γD. In this case, γB = 1 




R = ˆ   (2)
The recipient allocates its resource in direct proportion to the donor’s aid to each project. If the 



















































the second formula following from the fixed budget constraint. The quantity of interest is 
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It can be shown that the numerator of the grand fraction on the right is less than the denominator 
exactly when A1 > A2 and αD + ρD > 1, or when the opposite is true on both counts—that is, when 
A1, the project gaining aid, has a more economical scale than A2. If this holds, it guarantees the 
inequality since the left side is always at least 1. Then  0 ˆ
1 > ∂ ∂ A D  and increasing aid to project 1 
increases development. 
  But the inequality can fail in other cases—most easily when recipient-side resources are 
the dominant factor in the production of development (αD is much less than ρD, so αD/ρD + 1 is 
low) and project 1, the one gaining aid, is far less economically scaled than project 2. In this 
case, the first right-hand term of (3), the direct effect of the aid increase on development from 
project 1, is dwarfed by the second and third terms, which capture the indirect effect of the 
recipient’s resource reallocation. And these latter terms can sum to a negative value if the 
recipient is reallocating resources toward the project where marginal total productivity is lower. 
  Conclusion: If the recipient cares only about throughput, increasing aid can reduce 
  14development if recipient-side resources are an important ingredient in development and the 
project receiving the increase is of a relatively uneconomical scale. 
  If the recipient cares both about throughput and development rather than throughput 
alone, the same result should hold but the mathematics are more complex. Thus, to generalize, if 
the recipient is not purely developmentalist, increasing aid to uneconomically scaled projects can 
reduce development.  
 
Example 4. The recipient cares only about throughput and the donor moves aid from one project 
to another 
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This occurs under the same circumstances as in Example 2. 
  Conclusion: If the recipient cares only about throughput, when a donor moves aid from a 
project with lower marginal productivity to one with higher, development goes up. Otherwise, it 
goes down. 
Note that this conclusion is underpinned by the assumption that production of throughput 
has constant returns to scale. If there are large enough diseconomies of scale in throughput, then 
it is possible for the recipient to reallocate resources in the opposite direction from the donor, so 
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that development can go down even when the donor is shifting aid to a more economically scaled 
project. 
 
The empirical distribution of aid projects 
This section examines the empirical distribution of aid projects more closely, again using the 
CRS database. The purpose is to derive an empirical relationship between the total aid going to a 
country and the distribution of its projects by size. This will then serve to calibrate a simulation 
using a more sophisticated example of the models just presented. 
The distribution of projects by size, both within and across countries, follows clear 
patterns. In general, the distribution in a given country or group of countries is unimodal, of 
course has support above zero, and skews to the right. The lognormal distribution is therefore a 
promising model for the distribution, as Figures 1–3 confirm. They show the distributions of 
project size on a logarithmic scale, for all countries together, and for China and Tanzania alone. 
Project sizes are in thousands of dollars. As in Table 2, tallies are for the three most recent years 
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  Given the quality of the lognormal fit, the distribution of projects by size in a given 
country is well characterized by the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding 
distribution in log space, µ and σ. Moreover, these turn out to be strongly correlated with total 
project commitments. As a result, one can make a good prediction of the distribution of projects 
by size in a country given only the total amount, A, of aid committed to those projects. 
  To formalize this idea and rigorously estimate the best-fit lines, I fit the following 
































where x is the size of a project, A is total project funding commitments in thousands of dollars 
for 2001–03, µ0, σ0,  , and  are constants, and h(x) is the (lognormal) probability density for  µ c σ c
  18projects of size x. 
  I run the estimation two ways. In the first, there is a single lognormal project distribution 
for each recipient, as in Figures 1–3. The variables µ, σ, and A all refer to the full set of projects 
in a given recipient country. In the second, the sparser distributions of each donor-recipient pair 
are modeled, to allow for donor-level heterogeneity. Here, µ, σ, and A, refer to the distribution of 
projects of a given donor in a given recipient country. (See Table 3.) Almost all parameters are 
strongly different from 0. The parameters   and   are significantly higher in the second 
regression, meaning that for a given donor in a given recipient country, the project distribution 
shifts more quickly for a given aid increase than it does when aggregating across all donors.  
µ c σ c
 
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of model parameters 
 
 By  recipient 
By donor and 
recipient 
cµ  0.2707 0.3642 
  (0.0065)** (0.0036)** 
µ0  0.0546 0.0729 
  (0.0819) (0.0325)* 
cσ  0.1058 0.1284 
  (0.0043)** (0.0025)** 
σ0  0.9580 0.9859 
  (0.0541)** (0.0223)** 
N        79,426        79,426 
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample excludes 
Israel and recipients with population below 1 million.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
  The regression modeling a single distribution for each recipient is the basis for the fit 
lines in Figures 4–6. These show the empirical average and standard deviation of log project size 
by recipient for the 2001–03 data, as well as the number of projects. Data points are labeled with 
3-letter ISO country codes. The best-fit curve in the final graph, which plots the number of 
projects against total aid is computed using the fact that the average of a lognormal distribution is 
.
2









  According to the upper-left cell of Table 3, a factor-of-10 increase in total project aid to a 
country lifts the average log project size by 
0.2707 × ln 10 = 0.6233 
which is equivalent to multiplying the geometric average of project size (which in a lognormal 
distribution is also the median, e
µ) by a factor of 
e
0.6233 = 1.865. 
Intuitively speaking, a 10-fold increase in total aid to a country is associated in the data with an 
86.5% rise in representative project size. Since average project size rises much more slowly than 
total aid, the number of projects goes up. Along the same lines, regression 2 suggests that if a 
single donor increases its aid for a country 10-fold, its own typical project size goes up 131%. Of 
course these statistics tell us little about the true direction of causality. But they are useful for 
simulations. 
 






































































































































1000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
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Data Maximum likelihood best fit
 
 



























































































































































1000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Total aid, $ thousands
Data Maximum likelihood best fit
 
 









































































































































1000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Total aid, $ thousands
Data Prediction from maximum likelihood best fit
 
 
A simulation with sunk costs 
This section develops the earlier examples in two important ways. It introduces a notion of sunk 
cost. And it adapts the model to the continuous setting. It then reports the results of simulations 
partially calibrated using the empirical patterns just described. 
All of the earlier examples assume that the first penny the recipient invests in aid projects 
increases output of development and throughput. But it seems likely that aid projects have 
significant sunk costs that the recipient must cover for the project to proceed—meeting with 
donors in the capital, taking them on field visits, filing reports, and so on. We might expect sunk 
cost to rise with project size, but not as fast, according to a sunk cost function s(Ai). This is 
captured in the following modified Cobb-Douglas production functions: 
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Unlike in the earlier examples, there will be cases in which the recipient can maximize its 
utility by not funding certain projects. Indeed, it may not be able to afford to put resources into 
all projects. In general, the recipient will invest either 0 or more than s(Ai) in each project, since 
investing less than the sunk cost would produce no output and waste resources. Among the set of 
recipient-funded projects, F, the recipient will allocate its resource much as in the case where 
there are no sunk costs, such that marginal utility is equalized across projects. For example, if the 











































j A s R  term represents the piece of the recipient’s budget that is not consumed by 











 determines the 
allocation of that piece among funded projects. 
  But which projects will the recipient fund? In general, F can be characterized as set of 
size ranges, within each of which the recipient funds all projects. One range, however, could 
have an upper “bound” of infinity. In many cases, F consists of a single range. 
Table 4 illustrates. It takes the case where there are five projects, of sizes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
It assumes that the recipient is purely developmentalist, that sunk cost rises with an elasticity of 
0.8 with respect to aid  () ( )
8 . 0
i i A A s = , and that development is () ( ) .
5 . 0 5 . 0
i i i A s R A D − = The table 
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shows how the recipient’s resource allocation evolves as its budget envelope expands. When the 
resource budget, R, is just 1, the recipient cannot exceed the sunk cost of even the smallest 
project, project 1. As R increases, the recipient can afford project 1, and funds it. With further 
increases, it shifts to larger projects. As R rises above 10, it becomes possible and optimal for the 
recipient to fund two projects, then three, and eventually all the projects. F is usually contiguous. 
 
 
Table 4. Optimal allocation of recipient resource of among 5 projects of size 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
as resource budget R rises 
   Optimal allocation 
R R1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 
1  0 0 0 0 0
2  2.00 0 0 0 0
3 0  3.00  0 0 0
4 0  0  4.00 0 0
5  0 0 0 5.00 0
6  0 0 0 0 6.00
7  0 0 0 0 7.00
8  0 0 0 0 8.00
9  0 0 0 0 9.00
10 0  3.07  0 0 6.93
11 0  0  4.27 0 6.73
12  0 0 0 5.41 6.59
13  0 0 0 5.85 7.15
14  0 0 0 6.30 7.70
15  0 0 0 6.74 8.26
16  0 0 0 7.18 8.82
17 0  0  4.39 5.68 6.93
18 0  0  4.64 6.01 7.35
19 0  0  4.89 6.34 7.76
20 0  0  5.14 6.68 8.18
21 0  0  5.39 7.01 8.60
22  0 3.34 4.81 6.23 7.62
23  0 3.48 5.02 6.52 7.98
24  0 3.63 5.24 6.80 8.34
25  0 3.77 5.45 7.09 8.69
26  1.95 3.63 5.25 6.82 8.36
27  2.01 3.77 5.45 7.08 8.69
28  2.08 3.90 5.65 7.35 9.02
29  2.15 4.03 5.85 7.62 9.36
30  2.21 4.17 6.05 7.88 9.69
 
 
A second elaboration needed for the simulations is a translation of the model into the continuous 
setting. As developed more fully in the Appendix, this is done by replacing the finite set of 
projects, {Ai} with a differentiable function h() that gives the density of projects of a given size, and representing the recipient’s resource allocation rule with a distribution r(x). Development 
and throughput are then given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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  Moreover, as shown in the Appendix, except in degenerate cases, F, the optimal set of 
funded projects, is always contiguous in this new setting (with Cobb-Douglas production). In 
fact, it always takes one of two forms: all projects below a certain size, or all projects above a 
certain size. So as a matter of algorithm, the maximizing recipient investigates two strategies—
funding projects below or above a certain size. In each strategy, it seeks the size threshold, if 
any, that achieves a local maximum in utility, assuming that it allocates its resource among 
projects in F to equate marginal utility. It then determines which local optimum is the global one.  
The recipient’s choices of strategy and size cut-off of course depend on the parameters. 
So the idea of the simulations is to watch how the recipient’s resource allocation shifts as the 
distribution of aid projects on offer evolves, and to see how this affects development. Projects 
are simulated as lognormally distributed and completely determined by a single parameter, total 
aid, according to (4). In particular, using the empirical parameters in column 1 of Table 3, it is 
assumed that 
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where A is in thousands of dollars. Recall that as A increases, according to the empirical pattern 
the number of projects also increases. 
Letting x represent project size, the simulations further assume: 
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In words, development can have increasing returns to scale in one variant (0.6 + 0.6 > 1), once 
past sunk costs, and decreasing returns in an other (0.4 + 0.4 < 1). The recipient cares only about 
throughput, which is produced with constant returns to scale (0.8 + 0.2 = 1). The variables r(x), 
and s(x) are taken in thousands of purchasing-power-parity (PPP) dollars while A and x are taken 
in thousands of exchange-rate dollars. Sunk costs are thus $500 PPP for a $1,000 (exchange rate) 
project and rise with an elasticity of 0.8 with respect to size—so that, for example, those for a 
$1,000,000 project (exchange rate) are about $250,000 PPP. The resource budget is $200 
million, 1% of the PPP GDP of Tanzania, a country often pointed to as suffering from project 
proliferation. These parameter choices are meant to be reasonable and minimally arbitrary. 
  The simulations are not Monte Carlo. Representative project distributions are not 
generated. Rather, the problem is tackled analytically with the mathematics in the Appendix, the 
core challenge being to find the minimum or maximum project size that the recipient will fund in 
order to maximize throughput.
6 
Figure 7 shows how key variables evolve as aid rises in the variant with increasing 
returns to scale in development. Note first that the optimized value of B, called  rises 
monotonically with A—as it should since this is what the recipient is maximizing, and increasing 
, ˆ B
                                                 
  26
6 The simulation is performed using an object-oriented Visual Basic for Applications program and accessed via user-
defined functions in Microsoft Excel. The search algorithm for determining the minimum or maximum project sizes 
funded by the recipient is the “dbrent” routine in Press et al. (1988). The file is available from the author. A only adds new production possibilities. Similarly for the maximum achievable value of D, 
called But the actual value of D lags behind the ideal value, since the recipient is not 
maximizing it. For low aid levels, the ratio
. ˆ D
D D ˆ is close to unity (graphed against the right axis), 
but around $100 million, the ratio plunges dramatically, bottoming out after $1 billion in total 
aid. Meanwhile, growth of development slows with respect to growth in aid, but never quite goes 
negative. For comparison, in this data set, Tanzania received $1.3 billion in project aid in 2003. 
  What is behind the divergence between D and  potential and actual development? At 
low aid levels, the recipient’s budget is ample enough that it is optimal to fund essentially all 
projects—regardless of whether the recipient is maximizing development or throughput.
7 The 
recipient does not allocate its resource among these projects quite the way it would if it were 
maximizing development (it favors smaller projects, relatively), though the difference does not 
have a large impact. Development and throughput are essentially complements. But as aid rises 
and projects proliferate, and because the recipient cares only about throughput, it is more 
reluctant to de-fund small projects with high transaction cost than it would be if it were intent on 
exploiting the scale economies of larger projects to maximize development. The gap becomes 
noticeable when total aid reaches some $130 million. At this point, the optimal minimum project 
size for the recipient to fund is $300,000 in aid—optimal, that is, if it is maximizing 
development. But from the recipient’s throughput point of view, the optimal minimum project 
size is still only half a penny. (See Figure 8.) However, as total sunk costs continue rising (the 
bottom line in Figure 7), they eventually force even the throughput-minded recipient to de-fund 
small projects. The throughput-optimized size minimum then enters a catch-up period with 
respect to the development-optimized size minimum. But it never fully catches up, and so the 
, ˆ D
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7 “Essentially all” means that the minimum funded project size is a penny or less. ratio between actual development and potential development is permanently lowered. 
  The second simulation differs from the first in that the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas 
function for development are 0.4 instead of 0.6. Now there are diminishing returns to scale. 
Figure 9 shows that because the development production function again differs from the 
throughput production that the recipient maximizes, aid is still not deployed optimally, and an 
absorption constraint appears.. However, the divergence this time is even sharper once it begins, 
and shows no signs of stopping even as aid passes $10 billion, in that  D D ˆ continues declining. 
In fact, development declines in absolute terms. Why? This time the recipient departs from the 
development-optimal path not just in parameter choice, but in strategy. Because of the scale 
diseconomies, development is maximized when the recipient chooses to de-fund the largest 
projects. But the throughput-maximizing recipient instead de-funds the smallest projects, as 
shown in Figure 10. 
  As a sensitivity test, Figure 11 and Figure 12 show how the path for D changes when two 
crucial parameters are varied. Figure 11 shows the effect of halving or doubling cµ , the 
coefficient on total aid in the equation for µ, relative to its empirically derived value of 0.2707. 
Higher values of cµ lead to larger, fewer projects. Figure 11 does the same for cσ, whose 
empirical value is 0.1058. Not surprisingly, increasing cµ raises the aid level at which the 
development curve starts to bend. And when there are scale economies in development, it also 
substantially raises development for a given level of aid, especially once above that bend. 
However, when there are diseconomies of scale, varying cµ has much less impact. It raises the 
aid level at which the marginal impact goes negative, but, strikingly, lowers the peak value for 
development. This is because the benefits from larger projects of lower sunk costs and fewer de-
funded projects are offset by scale diseconomies. The overall picture is one of a hard ceiling of 
development impact when project economics favor small projects; this makes sense if, 
  28intuitively, the recipient government can only handle a limited number of projects. The picture is 
similar for cσ, for in a lognormal distribution σ also influences average project size according to 
the formula  .
2
2 σ µ+ e  
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Figure 10. Simulation with diseconomies of scale in development: threshold size of projects 
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Figure 11. Sensitivity analysis: varying cµ, the coefficient on total aid for average log 
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Figure 12. Sensitivity analysis: varying cσ, the coefficient on total aid for standard deviation 
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The above simulations assume for simplicity that the recipient cares only about throughput. If we 
assume, more realistically, that the recipient cares about both throughput and development, then 
the same pattern would appear, but less strongly. What is important is that three features of the 
model—the recipient not being purely developmentalist, differences in the throughput and 
development production functions, and sunk costs—interact to generate a notion of absorptive 
capacity for aid. Above a certain threshold level, the marginal productivity of aid declines 
precipitously—assuming, that is, that aid increase goes hand in hand with a pattern of project 
proliferation that is typical in the current cross-section of countries. The deep source of this 
threshold character is the discontinuous nature of conditionality. If recipients just cover sunk 
costs, projects go forward. If they fall just short, donors shut projects down.  
If donors break out of current proliferation patterns, they may be able to raise 
development impact in countries suffering from proliferation if there are scale economies to be 
exploited. Descending somewhat from the abstract world of the model, the key may be for 
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donors to emphasize sectors where scale economies are more likely, such as infrastructure. 
Scholarly examination of aid project proliferation, like the economics of aid 
administration generally, is in its infancy. Concern about the extent of project proliferation, 
especially in low-income “donor darlings,” is itself proliferating faster than the body of sharp 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the topic. Since this paper is primarily theoretical, its main 
value may lie in offering a mathematical paradigm. The aid process is conceived of as a set of 
production activities, lognormally distributed by size, each taking inputs from both donor and 
recipient. The complexity arises from differences in the production functions for two outputs and 
the differences in utility functions of the two agents, all of which ought to be tested empirically. 
  Indeed, this paper could serve as a point of departure for additional empirical research as 
well as theory. How great are sunk costs, what are they, and how do they vary with project size? 
How are aid projects best represented as production functions? Perhaps a more flexible form 
such as constant-elasticity-of-substitution functions is needed. Are recipient or donor resources 
the dominant factors in aid project production? How is the recipient resource R best thought of? 
Can it be measured? How does it vary by country? When do recipients refuse to invest resources 
in some aid projects even at the expense of their termination? Potential future directions in the 
theory include introducing alternative production functions, endogenizing donor behavior, 
allowing multiple donors, modeling interactions between projects, and repeated game aspects. 
  The model suggests that the question of when recipients refuse to invest resources in 
some aid projects is particularly important because the sharp drop in the marginal effectiveness 
of aid occurs at the point where it becomes optimal for development for the recipient to de-fund 
projects—and yet does not. The model does say that as aid continues to rise the recipient will 
eventually begin de-funding projects, but by the time there are such signs of trouble, the 
marginal and average productivity of aid will have already fallen substantially. This suggests that especially when donors are contemplating a double or tripling of aid to 
Africa, they need to be sensitive to indications, such as in Tanzania, that relatively 
developmentalist recipients are resisting the proliferation of projects and the associated 
administrative burden. While donors’ desire for monitoring and accountability is understandable, 
pushing these desires too hard in recipient countries with limited budgets can push the aid 
delivery process against structural limits and undermine overall effectiveness. In such countries 
donors should therefore contemplate varying the parameters within their control, funding fewer, 
larger aid activities. That in turn may call for careful analysis of which sectors offer the great 
scale economies for aid projects.
  34Appendix 1. A general model of aid projects 
 
The core model 
Write the development and throughput technologies as 
( ) i i i i R A D D , =  
( ) i i i i R A B B , =  
where i indexes projects. Di is development, Bi is “throughput” as a side-benefit, Ai is aid 
quantity going into the project, and Ri is the recipient-side resource. Ai will also be called the 
“size” of project i. To keep the notation compact, draw the equations together into vector-valued 
functions D(A,R) and B(A,R). Also, let  ∑ = i D D  (total development produced) and define 
analogous symbols for the Bi, Ri, and Ai (except that we will treat  ∑ = i R R as a binding budget 
constraint rather than a definition). We assume A, R ≥ 0—inputs are never negative. 
The recipient’s utility is   and the donor’s,  ( B D uR , ) ( ) B D uA , . Thus, both utilities depend 
only on the simple sums of the two kinds of outputs from individual projects. The recipient’s 
problem, given the donor’s aid allocation A and the recipient resource budget R, is 
( ) B D uR ,   max
R
 
such that R ≤ ′R ι and R ≥ 0 
where  is a column of 1’s. If uR satisfies the appropriate regularity conditions when considered 
as a function of A and R, we can analyze this problem using a Lagrangian: 
ι
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). , , R ,R A B ,R A D u i i i i i i R − ′ − = ∑ ∑ R ι R λ λ L  
Imposing  0 = ∇L  yields the first-order conditions for a maximum: 
() ι
R ι





  35where ∇R is the gradient operator with respect to R. In words, the recipient consumes its budget 
and allocates so that the marginal utility of its resource is equalized across projects to λ. The 
















is negative semi-definite. 
  To describe the dynamics as A varies, let  ( ) A R ˆ  be the vector-valued “indirect demand 
function” that maps the donor’s allocation of aid among projects to the (optimizing) recipient’s 
allocations of its resource. Define the “indirect supply functions” and indirect utility functions 
( ) ( ) ( )
() () ()
() ()() ()
() ()() () . ˆ , ˆ ˆ .
ˆ , ˆ ˆ
ˆ , ˆ
ˆ , ˆ
A B A D A
A B A D A
A R A B A B










These describe how output of development and throughput and the utility derived from them 
change as the donor varies its allocation of aid among projects and the recipient adapts its own 
allocation. Let   and  be the i
th components of  () A i D ˆ () A i B ˆ ( ) A D ˆ and ( ) A B ˆ , and  and () A D ˆ ( ) A B ˆ  be 
the sums of these components, or “total indirect supply functions.” These give total development 
and throughput for a given donor portfolio of projects of various sizes, assuming optimizing 
behavior on the part of the recipient. All these variables actually depend on the recipient resource 
budget, R, too, but we suppress this argument for clarity. A vector of central interest is the 
gradient that is, the derivative of total development with respect to the donor’s allocation of 
aid across projects. The chain rule gives 
, ˆ D ∇
. ˆ ˆ R R A ∇ ⋅ ∇ + ∇ = ∇ D D D   (6)
  36  One special case is worth noting. If the recipient is “purely developmentalist,” i.e., 
 then  which by the first order condition is just  , D uR = , R R R u D ∇ = ∇ ι′ λ because the marginal 
development impact of the recipient’s resource is equalized across projects. If R is fixed, then the 
elements of  sum to zero, meaning that is orthogonal to  R ˆ ∇ R ˆ ∇ . ι′ λ  As a result, the second term 
of (6) drops out: 
. ˆ D D A ∇ = ∇   (7)
If the recipient is a development-optimizer, then the marginal impact of a change in aid, 
factoring in how the recipient will reallocate its own resources at the margin, equals the marginal 
impact that would occur if the recipient made no reallocation. Although the recipient may in fact 
reallocate its resource at this margin, it has no effect on development, since at the margin the 
development impact of its resource is equalized across projects. This is an example of the 
Envelope Theorem (Varian 1992). 
As discussed in text, we can introduce a notion of sunk cost, which the recipient must 
cover out of its budget for the project to go forward. It rises with project size, but not as fast, 
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And we can translate the model into the continuous setting by replacing the finite set of 
projects, {Ai} with a differentiable function h() that gives the density of projects of a given size. 
Assuming that the recipient puts the same amount of resource into each project of any given size, 
which it should by symmetry, its resource allocation rule can be expressed as function of project 
  37size: r(x). Equations (8) translates to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






dx x h x s x r x B B




   
where F is the set of projects that the recipient chooses to fund, ( )( ) { }. | x s x r x F ≥ =  
 
The Cobb-Douglas case 
The simulations reported in the main text assume that D and B are both Cobb-Douglas. Here we 
derive the recipient’s solution in this particularly tractable case. Let αD and ρD, αB and ρB be the 
exponents that characterize the two production functions. Then: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






dx x h x s x r x B









The mathematics of the recipient’s problem are essentially identical whether it is a pure 
development or a pure throughput optimizer (the two possibilities that are easiest to analyze). So 
consider the case when the recipient is purely developmentalist. Its problem is 
()D
x r
  max  
. ) ( ) ( such that 
F
R dx x h x r ≤ ∫  
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  We must apply the calculus of variations to confirm that (10) is the optimum for a given 
  38F. This is more easily done if the problem is recast so that the budget constrain becomes a 
boundary condition. So define the function R(x) to be the total resource that the recipient invests 
in projects of size x or smaller. Then we have: 
()() ∫ ≡
x
dy y h y r x R
0 ) (  
() () () () ( )()
() () () x h x s
x h
x R












= − ≡  
(11) 
Thus according to (9), 
( ) ∫ =
F
dx x D δ  
The recipient’s problem is then 
() ( ) ∫
F
x R dx x δ   max  
( ) .   and   0 ) 0 ( such that  R R R = ∞ =  
(12)
This is a calculus of variations problem in which the integrand can be expressed purely as a 
function of the derivative of the argument:  ( ) x δ  depends directly on ( ) x R′  but not   The 
version of the Euler equation that   must satisfy in this case is 













 (Chiang 1992, p. 37). Differentiating (11),  
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Since () , 1 D D D ρ α γ − = (). 1
1 =
− + D D D x
ρ γ α The above expression therefore does not vary with x, so 
it satisfies the Euler equation, as needed.  
Equation (10) describes the recipient’s solution given the set of funded projects, F, but 
does not include a recipe for F. To study F, we first substitute the formula for the recipient’s 
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 (taking advantage in the second step of the fact that αD + γDβD=γD).  
It is impossible to write down a general, explicit solution for the F that maximizes this 
geometric average of integrals. However, in this Cobb-Douglas case, F can be tightly 
characterized, assuming sunk cost has constant elasticity with respect to project size. 
 
Proposition. If we can write   then the set F that maximizes (13) is almost always 
contiguous and takes the form (0, MAX] or  [MIN, ∞) where MIN, MAX > 0. 
() , 0
s c x s x s =
In other words, except in certain degenerate examples, the recipient’s optimal strategy is to fund 
all projects below a certain size or all projects above a certain size—or, as a special case of the 
  40latter, all projects of any size (MIN = 0). 
Proof. A priori, F could consist of multiple disjoint segments within the set of non-negative 
numbers. Let S = [x1, x2] be such a segment. Then (13) can be expanded to 
() ()
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Analysis of how to maximize (14) is easier if we work with its logarithm. Since x1 and x2 are 
parameters within the recipient’s control, at a maximum, x1 and x2 are each either roots of a 
derivative of ln u or boundary solutions: 
( )
() . or     0 ln
0 or     0 ln
2 2
1 1
∞ = = ∂ ∂




If x1 is an interior solution, then differentiating the log of (14) leads to 
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  41which is almost identical to (15). So if x1 and x2 are both interior,   This equation 
only admits solutions in special cases, which are unrepresentative and degenerate, in the sense 
that an infinitesimal perturbation of the parameters will cause them to disappear. If γ  exactly 
equals cs, then the equation has infinitely many solutions. But if they differ even infinitesimally 
it has only one:   But if is itself a degenerate solution in the continuous setting 
since the integrals bounded by x1 and x2 in (14) are 0. Thus in general x1 and x2 are not both 
interior. x1 takes a boundary value (0) or x2 effectively does (∞), or both. 
. 2 1
s s c c x x
− − =
γ γ
. 2 1 x x = 2 1 x x =
  The above argument shows that S takes the form asserted in the proposition. But S is only 
one piece of F. In general, since F is the disjoint union of segments in such forms, it could itself 
take one of those forms. Or it might take the form ( ] [ ), , , 0 2 1 ∞ ∪ x x where 0 < x1 < x2. But an 
argument almost identical to the one above shows that it cannot. In particular, such an F could 
only be a maximum if x1 = 0 or x2 = ∞ or x1 = x2, none of which allows F to be disconnected. □ 
 
  So as a matter of algorithm, the maximizing recipient investigates two strategies: funding 
projects below or above a certain size. In each strategy, it seeks the size threshold, if any, that 
achieves a local maximum in utility. It then determines which local optimum is the global one. 
All of the forgoing applies mutatis mutandis if the recipient is a pure throughput rather than 
development optimizer. 
  The proof does not carry over to discrete distributions of projects such as in Table 4 of 
the main text. These can be thought of as distributions, h(x), that are infinitely dense at some 
points, and non-differentiable there. In these distributions, the possibility rejected in the above 
proof that is no longer degenerate, and all we can conclude is that F is a set of singletons, 
which is not revealing. However, the larger the set of projects and the better it can be 
2 1 x x =
  42approximated as a continuous distribution, the greater will be the tendency for F to be 
contiguous, a tendency seen in Table 4. 
  One final result needed to run the simulations in the main text is the formula for 
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